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We examine how import-competing industries adjust to rising import pen-
etration. In particular, we are interested in the eﬀects on domestic ﬁrms’
outputs and productivity. The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we con-
struct a simple model of an import-competing industry with heterogeneous
ﬁrms and derive hypotheses regarding the short- and long-run adjustment
to rising import penetration. Second, we use micro data for the German
clothing industry for the period 2000—2006 to examine how some of these
hypotheses hold up empirically. The clothing industry is an ideal candidate
for such a study, since, in the period under investigation, there has been
a signiﬁcant increase in import penetration brought about in part by the
successive elimination of import quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.
We observe large changes in production, employment and market structure
in this sector.
The focus of our analysis is on the adjustments that are channelled
throughchanges in the competition betweenﬁrms in the industry, i.e., through
changes in equilibrium outputs and market structure. We therefore pur-
sue a partial-equilibrium approach in which labor market and other general-
equilibrium eﬀects are neglected.1 The model that we construct to investigate
the competitive eﬀects of greater import penetration is a variant of Long et
al. (2009). Firms are ex post heterogeneous as in Melitz (2003): they de-
cide whether to enter the industry before they observe their productivity
draw. After entry ﬁrms individually learn their productivity, and ﬁnally play
a Bayesian Cournot game determining their domestic sales. Speciﬁcally we
let the output choices of domestic ﬁrms be best responses to each other and
to the import volume. The quantity of imports is our policy variable; we
assume that it is driven by forces outside of the model, such as by govern-
ment policy regarding import quotas.2 The model allows us to derive the
comparative static eﬀects of greater import penetration on the output of do-
1This is easily justiﬁed by the fact that employment in the clothing industry accounted
for only 0.2% of total employment and 0.8% of industrial employment in Germany in 2002.
2In fact, European quotas on imports of textiles and clothing were raised twice during
the sample period in connection with the phasing-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement
agreed to in the Uruguay Round negotiations of GATT. The WTO Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing (ATC) that regulates the phase-out speciﬁes a signiﬁcant integration step
on January 1, 2002 and a ﬁnal lifting of all quotas on December 31, 2004 (European
Commission, 2000). For more information and estimates of export tax equivalents of the
MFA quotas see Francois and Woerz (2009).
1mestic ﬁrms, and it allows us to determine how import penetration aﬀects
the cut-oﬀ level of ﬁrm productivity that separates ﬁrms that are not able
to sell any output from the more productive ones that serve the domestic
market. From the changes in ﬁrm-level output decisions and the selection
eﬀect induced by changes in the cut-oﬀ productivity we can then compute
how import penetration aﬀects aggregate industry productivity.
In this framework we investigate the eﬀects of greater import penetration
in the short run when the number of potential entrants is ﬁxed, and in the
long run when the number of entrants adjusts to the new market conditions.
We discover important diﬀerences in the adjustment patterns depending on
the time horizon. In the short run, adjustment is driven by a selection eﬀect:
the least eﬃcient and thus smallest ﬁrms are forced to seize production when
the volume of imports rises. The number of active ﬁrms, and the outputs,
mark-ups and proﬁts of surviving ﬁrms fall. The elimination of the least
eﬃcient ﬁrms implies that the average productivity of domestic survivors
rises. Hence greater import penetration has a pro-competitive eﬀect in the
short run. In the long run, however, the adjustment takes place through
the exit of domestic ﬁrms, and the selection eﬀect disappears. This has two
important implications. First, in the long-run, exit should be observed across
the whole size or productivity distribution and not just among the small
ﬁrms. Second, there is no change in the average productivity of domestic
ﬁrms. In other words, import penetration ﬁrst hits the least eﬃcient or
smallest ﬁrms. In the long run, however, big ﬁrms also exit, which makes it
possible again for smaller, less eﬃcient ﬁrms to survive. The pro-competitive
eﬀects associated with greater import penetration thus wash out in the long
run.
The data we have collected are suited to examine the short-run predictions
of the model. Since our sample is comparatively short and import shocks
appear throughout, we do not expect the industry to have settled in a long-
run equilibrium yet by the end of the sample period. Our empirical analysis,
in fact, strongly supports the model’s short-run predictions.
The current paper contributes to the growing literature on intra-industry
adjustment to trade liberalization, initiated by Bernard et al. (2003) and
Melitz (2003). See Wagner (2007) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for
recent surveys. On the theory side, our paper is related to Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) who also take a partial-equilibrium approach to investi-
gating the eﬀects of trade liberalization on industries with heterogeneous
ﬁrms. Their model features monopolistic competition, whereas our model has
2oligopolistic competition. However, the short- and long-run adjustment pat-
terns predicted by the two models are qualitatively similar: unilateral trade
liberalization that leads to greater import penetration has pro-competitive
eﬀects in the short run due to the selection eﬀect. In the long run, these
pro-competitive eﬀects disappear or are even reversed.3
On the empirical side, our paper is related to Chen et al. (2009) who
study the short- and long-run adjustments to trade liberalization by EU
manufacturing industries, and to Fernandes (2007) who examines the eﬀect
of trade liberalization on productivity in Colombian manufacturing. The
former paper examines the impact on prices, mark-ups and productivity,
and ﬁnds a pro-competitive eﬀect of trade liberalization in the short run,
but no strong evidence for a pro-competitive eﬀect in the long run. The
latter concludes that greater import penetration has signiﬁcant productivity
enhancing eﬀects.4
Our study of the adjustment to trade shocks of import-competing ﬁrms
in the German clothing industry complements recent work by Demidova et
al. (2009) and Kee and Krishna (2009) on the performance of Bangladeshi
apparel exporters. Controlling for ﬁrm-market speciﬁc demand shocks, these
papers show among other things that a decrease in trade barriers allows
ﬁrms to become exporters that would otherwise have been too unproductive
to participate in export markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model. In Section 3 we derive testable hypotheses concerning the eﬀects
of import penetration in the short and in the long run. The data and the
empirical analysis are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes, and the
Appendix contains proofs.
2 The Model
We build on Long et al. (2009) to construct a simple model of a domes-
tic market, in which heterogeneous domestic producers compete with each
3An anti-competitive eﬀect appears in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) if the unilateral
removal of trade barriers leads to entry of relatively ineﬃcient ﬁrms abroad, thereby raising
prices of foreign exporters.
4Other related papers include Baldwin and Gu (2009), and Lileeva and Treﬂer (2008)
who study the ﬁrm-level impact of bilateral trade liberalization following the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement.
3other and with imports. The quantity of imports, M, is regulated by an im-
port quota. Domestically produced and imported goods are homogeneous,
and domestic ﬁrms engage in Bayesian-Cournot competition. Consumers
have quadratic quasi-linear preferences over the homogeneous good and a
numeraire that give rise to a linear inverse demand function,
p = A − Q − M, (1)
where p and Q denote price and total sales of domestic ﬁrms, respectively, and
A > 0 is the demand intercept.. Labor is the only factor of production and
comes in ﬁxed supply. Assuming that the numeraire good is produced under
constant returns to scale at unit cost and traded freely on a competitive
world market, the equilibrium wage at home is equal to one, and trade is
always balanced.
Let n denote the number of domestic entrants. Firms produce under
constant (but ex-ante unknown) marginal cost, equal to the unit labor re-
quirement. We assume that the marginal cost of ﬁrm i = 1,...,n, denoted
by ci, is revealed to the ﬁrm only after it has incurred a sunk set-up cost
fe > 0. The ex-ante cumulative distribution F(ci) has support on the inter-
val [0,  c]; the density is denoted by f(ci). We assume that the marginal-cost
realization is private information of each ﬁrm. Hence output decisions are
made under asymmetric information. Upon learning its marginal cost, ﬁrm i
will produce a quantity q(ci) for the domestic market. This output decision
will depend on the expected output of all rival ﬁrms, denoted by ￿ Q−i, and
the import quota M. Firm i’s ﬁrst-order condition for its output qi(ci) is
p(qi(ci)+ ￿ Q−i+M)+qi(ci)p
′(qi(ci)+ ￿ Q−i+M)−ci ≤ 0,(= 0 if qi(ci) > 0). (2)
From (2), we may derive the critical marginal cost, ￿ ci ≡ A − ￿ Q−i − M,
for which ﬁrm i’s output becomes zero. The ﬁrst-order condition gives rise
to the best response function
qi(ci) =
￿
0 if ci ≥ ￿ ci,
1
2 (￿ ci − ci) if ci < ￿ ci. (3)
Since in the current model a ﬁrm’s mark-up is the same as its output, the
ex-post proﬁt in the domestic market is equal to
πi(ci) =
￿
0 if ci ≥ ￿ ci,
1
4 (￿ ci − ci)
2 if ci < ￿ ci.
(4)






(￿ ci − ci)
2 dF(c) − fe. (5)
Since ﬁrms draw their marginal costs from the same distribution, their
expected outputs will all be the same in equilibrium. Firm i will thus face
n − 1 domestic rivals, each expected to produce and sell ￿ q units; hence,
￿ Q−i = (n − 1)￿ q. The critical value of the marginal cost can thus be written
as
￿ c = A − (n − 1)￿ q − M. (6)















[A − (n − 1)￿ q − M − c]
2 dF(c) − fe. (8)
In our analysis below we will refer to the eﬀect of an increase in the import
quota on ﬁrm and industry productivity. Following Melitz (2003) we deﬁne
ﬁrm productivity as the inverse of the marginal production cost, and industry
productivity as the inverse of the expected marginal cost, conditional on ﬁrms
producing positive output. This conditional expectation is given by






3 The Eﬀects of Import Penetration
We now examine how greater import penetration in the form of a marginal
increase in M aﬀects the equilibrium of the model. We distinguish between
a short-run scenario in which there is no entry, and a long-run scenario in
which ﬁrms enter or exit until their ex-ante proﬁt is equal to zero.
53.1 Short-run Eﬀects
In the absence of market entry the equilibrium ￿ q is determined by equation
(7). Using this equation we ﬁnd that a marginal increase in the import quota





2 + (n − 1)F(￿ c)
< 0. (10)










2 + (n − 1)F(￿ c)
< 0, (12)
so that the least eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms are forced to produce zero output.
It is also easy to see from (3) and (4) how the selection eﬀect reduces the
equilibrium outputs of the surviving ﬁrms. Since expected mark-ups and
proﬁts are proportional to output, they, too, fall. Greater import penetration
thus has a clear pro-competitive eﬀect in the short run.
The eﬀect of a marginal increase in M on industry productivity is also
driven by the selection eﬀect: as the least eﬃcient domestic producers are
forced to reduce their output to zero, average industry productivity rises:
d
dM






























We can summarize the testable hypotheses for the short run as follows:
Summary 1 In the short run an increase in import penetration:
(H1) forces the least eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms to become inactive,
(H2) lowers the outputs (and hence mark-ups and proﬁts) of surviving do-
mestic ﬁrms,
(H3) raises the average productivity of domestic survivors.
63.2 Long-run Eﬀects
Now consider the case of an endogenous market structure. Free entry and






[A − (n − 1)￿ q − M − c]
2 dF(c) − fe = 0. (16)
The comparative static results of an increase in M on the expected equilib-
rium output ￿ q and the number of ﬁrms n are obtained by total diﬀerentiation
of (7) and (16); proofs are in the Appendix.
We ﬁnd that an increase in the import quota has very diﬀerent eﬀects in
the long run than in the short run. In particular, the exit of domestic ﬁrms
(dn/dM < 0) turns out to be the only channel of adjustment in the long
run. The output of surviving ﬁrms stays put (d￿ q/dM = 0), and there is no
selection eﬀect (d￿ c/dM = 0). In other words, in the long run it is not just
the least eﬃcient and thus smallest ﬁrms that exit the market. Rather, exit
occurs at all productivity and thus size levels such that the critical value of
the marginal cost at which a ﬁrm remains active is unchanged. The absence
of a selection eﬀect also implies that in the long run there is no change in
industry productivity, as can be easily ascertained from (15). Thus the pro-
competitive eﬀects of greater import penetration disappear completely in the
long run, giving rise to a distinct intertemporal pattern of adjustment.
We can summarize the testable hypotheses for the long run as follows:
Summary 2 In the long run an increase in import penetration:
(H1-LR) lowers the number of domestic ﬁrms,
(H2-LR) leaves the output (and hence mark-ups and proﬁts) of surviving domes-
tic ﬁrms unchanged,
(H3-LR) leaves industry productivity unchanged.
4 Empirical Application: The German Cloth-
ing Industry, 2000 — 2006
To examine how the hypotheses derived from our model for the short run
hold up empirically we perform a case study for the German clothing industry
7during the period 2000 to 2006.5 In accordance with the WTO Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) European quotas on imports of clothing
were raised signiﬁcantly on January 1, 2002, and ﬁnally lifted on December
31, 2004. Table 1 documents basic facts for the German clothing industry
between 2000 (before the ﬁrst rise in import quotas) and 2006 (two years
after the lifting of all quotas).6 The lifting of quotas was accompanied by
a dramatic decline in production by 46 percent, an increase in imports by
4.6 percent, and a pronounced increase in the ratio of imports to domestic
production from 5.31 to 10.31 between 2000 and 2006.
[Table 1 near here]
During the period under consideration import prices declined in each
segment of the clothing industry (although the decline was only tiny for
underwear), while prices for clothing from domestic production increased
(with the exception of other outerwear). The relation of prices for imports
to prices for domestic products fell from 2000 to 2005 and 2006 in all segments
of the clothing industry. This increase in price competitiveness of imports,
however, was only minor in both other outerwear and underwear.
[Table 2 near here]
In our empirical investigation we use panel data for enterprises from the
clothing industry. The data are based on information from a regular survey
that is administered by the statistical oﬃces in Germany. This survey, the
monthly report for establishments in manufacturing industries, covers all
local production units from manufacturing industries that have at least 20
employees or that belong to an enterprise with a total of at least 20 employees.
Participation of ﬁrms in the survey is mandated in oﬃcial statistics law, and
5Since our sample covers only the years from 2000 to 2006 and import shocks appear
throughout, we do not expect the industry to have settled in a long-run equilibrium yet
by the end of the sample period. Therefore, the hypotheses derived from our model for
the long run cannot be tested empirically in this paper.
6The descripitve results at the industry level are for the clothing industry without
“Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur (1830)” because no price index
is available for domestic production and imports for this industry. The share of the fur
industry in the clothing industry was tiny in both domestic production (0.57 percent) and
imports (0.97 percent) in 2000. The six enterprises from this industry, however, that were
active in 2000 in Germany are included in the empirical tests of the hypotheses.
8the ﬁrms have to report the true ﬁgures. The survey collects information on
the location of the establishment, the industry it is active in, whether it is
part of a multi-establishment enterprise or not, hours worked by blue-collar
workers, gross wages and salaries, total number of persons working in the
establishment, number of blue-collar workers, sum of sales inside Germany,
and of sales outside Germany. Information from the monthly surveys is
either summed up for a year, or average values based on monthly ﬁgures are
computed, and a panel data set is built from annual data. Furthermore, the
information collected at the establishment level has been aggregated at the
enterprise level.7
Firms in the clothing industry are heterogeneous. Table 3 shows that in
the industry as a whole and in its segments enterprises diﬀer considerably by
size (measured by the number of employees) and labor productivity (mea-
sured by sales per employee). Firms from the 90th percentile are larger than
ﬁrms from the 10th percentile by a factor of 10 in the clothing industry as a
whole, and by a factor of 14 more productive.8 The degree of heterogeneity
is comparably large at the 4-digit level, especially in the large industries 1822
(other outerwear) and 1823 (underwear). This illustrates that our modeling
framework that assumes ﬁrm heterogeneity in the industry is appropriate.
[Table 3 near here]
According to our ﬁrst hypothesis, H1, an increase in import competition
forces the least eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms to become inactive. In the empirical
investigation a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as inactive in a year if the number of em-
ployees reported in the data set is zero in the respective year. The number of
employees reported in the data set is the average of the reported numbers of
employees from the monthly report for all the months when the ﬁrm reported
positive numbers of employees. If a ﬁrm was active, say, from January to
October in year t but became inactive in November, we set the number of
employees in year t equal to the average number of employees reported for
the months January to October. In year t + 1 (and in the following years)
7A more detailed description of the information in these data is given in Konold (2007).
The data are conﬁdential but not exclusive; see Zühlke et al.(2004) for information how
to access the data in the research data centers of the statistical oﬃces. To facilitate
replication the Stata do-ﬁle used to compute the results reported here is available from
the second author on request.
8Note that the minimum and the maximum of both the number of employees and the
labor productivity are conﬁdential because these numbers refer to speciﬁc enterprises.
9the ﬁrm is classiﬁed as inactive. A ﬁrm is classiﬁed as inactive, too, if the
number of employees dropped below the cutoﬀ-point of 20 employees that is
decisive for the participation in the survey. Furthermore, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed
as inactive if it is relocated from the clothing industry to another industry, or
relocated out of Germany, because in these cases no employees are reported
in the data set for this ﬁrm in the German clothing industry. Data protection
laws prevent a closer investigation of the cases that, for various reasons, are
classiﬁed as inactive. In what follows ﬁrms that are active in a year after
2000 will be labeled "survivors", and those that are not will be called "exits".
In our econometric investigation we measure ﬁrm eﬃciency by labor pro-
ductivity, deﬁned as the amount of sales per employee.9 Results for H1 are
reported in Table 4. In 2000, there were 614 enterprises in the clothing in-
dustry. Only 310 of these enterprises were still active in 2005 and 274 in
2006. Only 45 percent of the ﬁrms, therefore, remained active over the whole
period. In line with H1, labor productivity in the ﬁrms that became inac-
tive before 2005 and 2006 was lower in 2000 than in the ﬁrms that remained
active. This diﬀerence was large–on average, future survivors were more
than 50 percent more eﬃcient than future exits. The diﬀerence in means is
statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level according to a t-test.
[Table 4 near here]
However, if one only looks at diﬀerences in the mean values for both
groups, one focuses on just one moment of the distribution of productivity.
A stricter test that considers all moments is a test for stochastic dominance of
the distribution for survivors over the distribution for exits. More formally,
let F and G denote the cumulative distribution functions of productivity
for survivors and exits. If F(x) − G(x) = 0, the two distributions do not
diﬀer, while ﬁrst order stochastic dominance of F relative to G means that
F(z)−G(z) must be less or equal zero for all values of z, with strict inequal-
ity for some z. Whether this holds or not is tested non-parametrically by
adopting the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (see Conover 1999, p. 456ﬀ.). The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the distribution for survivors ﬁrst-
order stochastically dominates the distribution for exits. These ﬁndings are
9Note that the data do not include information on value added or the capital stock
of the enterprise. Therefore, we cannot use value added per employee or total factor
productivity to measure eﬃciency.
10in line with H1.10
Our second hypothesis, H2, states that an increase in import penetration
lowers the average outputs and mark-ups of surviving domestic ﬁrms. Output
is measured by sales (in constant prices). From the data we cannot compute
the mark-up. However, according to the model output and mark-up should
be proportional and hence move in the same direction. Results for H2 are
reported in Table 5. For survivors average sales were considerably higher in
2000 compared to 2005 and 2006. The diﬀerence in means is statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and positive, according to a t-test at error
levels of less than one percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. These ﬁndings
are in line with H2.
[Table 5 near here]
The third hypothesis, H3, states that an increase in import penetration
raises the average productivity of domestic survivors. Productivity is mea-
sured by sales per employee (in constant prices). Results for H3 are reported
in Table 6. In line with this hypothesis, the productivity of survivors was
higher in 2005 and 2006 than in 2000. The diﬀerence, however, was small
from an economic point of view and not statistically signiﬁcant at any con-
ventional level.
[Table 6 near here]
The big picture, then, is that the hypotheses derived from our model for
the short run hold up empirically for the German clothing industry during
the period 2000 to 2006. The increase in import penetration forced the
least eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms to exit the market, lowered the average output
and raised the average productivity of domestic survivors, although the last
eﬀect is small and not statistically signiﬁcant. Consistent with our model,
therefore, productivity changes by virtue of selection, not at the ﬁrm level.
10A similar result is reported by Wagner (2010) in a test of a hypothesis derived from
a model by Hopenhayn (1992) for the dynamics of industries with heterogeneous ﬁrms.
Using plant level panel data for Germany Wagner (2010) reports that ﬁrms that exited in
year t were less productive in t-1 than ﬁrms that continued to produce in t.
115 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a simple oligopoly model of an industry with
heterogeneous ﬁrms and exogenous or endogenous market structure. The
model yielded predictions regarding the short- and long-run adjustment of
the domestic industry to increased import penetration. In line with the
theoretical hypotheses for the short run the increase in import penetration in
the German clothing industry forced the least eﬃcient domestic ﬁrms to exit
the market, lowered the average output and raised the average productivity
of domestic surviving ﬁrms between 2000 and 2006.
Our study illustrates that a simple oligopoly model of an import-competing
industry with heterogeneous ﬁrms can be used to guide an empirical study
that uses ﬁrm level data to investigate the short-run consequences of ris-
ing import penetration. This kind of analysis can inform policy debates, and
can help to produce insights into the consequences of globalization for import
competing industries.
An open question is whether the hypotheses derived from our model for
the long run hold up empirically, too. Unfortunately, the ﬁrm level data that
are available to us do not cover a long enough period to tackle this question.
Another open question is whether our results are generally valid over space
and time. Further research using ﬁrm level data from other countries and
other periods is needed to shed light on this question.
Appendix
5.1 Expected Output
The expected output of a domestic ﬁrm is








[￿ c − c]dF(c) (17)
12Evaluating the integral on the right-hand side of (17) by parts, and deﬁning
φ(c) ≡ [￿ c − c], we have
￿ ￿ c
0













because φ(￿ c) = F(0) = 0 and φ
′(c) = −1.
5.2 Long-run Eﬀects
Total diﬀerentiation of (7), (16) yields
￿
2 + (n − 1)F(￿ c) ￿ qF(￿ c)






















Since ￿ c = A − (n − 1)￿ q − M, we have
d￿ c
dM






− 1 = 0.
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15Table 1:    The Clothing Industry in Germany – Production and Imports (2000, 2005, 2006) 
 
 
          Production (1,000 €; constant prices, 2000 = 100)   
         
WZ  Description      2000      2005      2006   
 
1810  Leather clothes     21505      14018        15824 
 
1821  Workwear      108488         89350                    96804 
 
1822  Other outerwear    1848534    1201246    943165 
 
1823  Underwear      952762       521160                 519544 
 
1824  Other wearing 
  apparel and accessories  375690       194154      208187 
 
Total          3306976    2019928    1783524 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
          Imports (1,000 €; constant prices, 2000 = 100) 
         
WZ  Description      2000      2005      2006   
 
1810  Leather clothes     575635     380549     387379 
 
1821  Workwear      343855     451932     477598 
 
1822  Other outerwear    8388101    8351133    8947524 
 
1823  Underwear      5917061    5715892    6250010 
 
1824  Other wearing 
  apparel and accessories  2350095    2114676    2328617 
 
Total          17574747    17014182    18391128 
 
 
          Ratio of Imports to Production   
         
WZ  Description      2000      2005      2006   
 
1810  Leather clothes     26.77      27.15      24.48 
 
1821  Workwear       3.17       5.05       4.93 
 
1822  Other outerwear     4.54       6.95       9.49 
 
1823  Underwear       6.21      10.97      12.03 
 
1824  Other wearing 
  apparel and accessories   6.23      10.89      11.19 
 
Total           5.31       8.42      10.31 
 
 
Source:  Federal  Statistical  Office;  own  calculations.  WZ  refers  to  the  German  classification  of  
              economic activities Table 2:    The Clothing Industry in Germany – Price index for domestic production and 
                 imports (2000 = 100) in 2005 and 2006 
 
 
          Price index for domestic production (2000 = 100)   
         
WZ  Description      2005      2006         
 
1810  Leather clothes     102.6      103.0 
 
1821  Workwear      101.7      101.6 
 
1822  Other outerwear     97.5       98.0 
 
1823  Underwear      101.0      102.0 
 
1824  Other wearing 





          Price index for imports (2000 = 100)   
         
WZ  Description      2005      2006         
 
1810  Leather clothes      89.0       88.4 
 
1821  Workwear       75.1       73.8 
 
1822  Other outerwear     95.3       95.8 
 
1823  Underwear       99.2       99.9 
 
1824  Other wearing 




    Relation of price index for imports to price index for domestic production (2000 = 1.00) 
         
WZ  Description      2005      2006         
 
1810  Leather clothes     0.87      0.86 
 
1821  Workwear      0.74      0.73 
 
1822  Other outerwear    0.98      0.98 
 
1823  Underwear      0.98      0.98 
 
1824  Other wearing   




Source:  Federal  Statistical  Office;  own  calculations.  WZ  refers  to  the  German  classification  of  
              economic activities Table 3:    The Clothing Industry in Germany – Distribution of size and labor productivity 
 
 
            Size distribution (number of employees) in 2000   
         
WZ  Description      Number  Mean    Standard  p10    p25    p50    p75    p90 
          of firms       deviation 
 
18  Clothing      614    108.93    190.21    22.58    29.17    50.17    113.22    231.00   
 
1810  Leather clothes      11     27.98     15.65      x      x    23.33      x       x   
1821  Workwear       34     74.01     73.30    24.58    29.25    42.67    104.67    150.17 
1822  Other outerwear    318    128.16    197.10    22.75    31.00    61.46    146.25    284.83  
1823  Underwear      152    113.45    240.01    22.92    30.88    50.50     98.17    213.50   
1824  Other wearing 




        Distribution of labor productivity (sales per employee) in 2000   
         
WZ  Description      Number  Mean    Standard  p10    p25    p50    p75    p90 
          of firms       deviation 
 
18  Clothing      614    127576.7  151049.5  18661.81  36812.29  87101.82  162053.3  260051.7 
 
1810  Leather clothes      11    109549.0  75917.4      x                     x    98150.74      x        x 
1821  Workwear       34    117876.2  72741.43  33714.01  61675.3  109592.7  144578.7  251211.4 
1822  Other outerwear    318    144435.5  179990.6  17751.88  27311.05  94840.4  191559.9  310930.0  
1823  Underwear      152    122084.5  139719.1  18898.97  37931.7  79670.1  155155.9  255593.6 
1824  Other wearing 
  apparel and accessories   93     87223.23  53685.02  25837.08  48881.58  77967.28  115658.8  155561.6 
       
 
 
Source: Own calculations. WZ refers to the German classification of economic activities. p10 refers to the 10
th percentile of the distribution, etc. An x indicates that 




Number of firms    Number of employees     
2000  2005  2006    2000  2005  2006 
 




Labor productivity (sales per employee; average) in 2000 
 
Survivors until 2005    Exits until 2005   Difference between   H0: equal means  Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
(N = 310)      (N = 304)    Survivors and exits  Ha: difference > 0  H0: Productivity higher in survivors than in exits 
 
153535       101106     52428      t = 4.370    p = 0.997 




Survivors until 2006     Exits until 2006   Difference between   H0: equal means  Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
(N = 274)      (N = 340)    Survivors and exits  Ha: difference > 0  H0: Productivity higher in survivors than in exits 
 
160247       101248     58999      t = 4.792    p = 0.997 








Average sales per firm (in constant prices (2000 = 100)) 
 
 
2000    2005    Difference between   H0: equal means   
(N = 310)  (N = 310)  2000 and 2005   Ha: difference > 0   
 
 
2.46e+07  2.15e+07  3076428    t = 2.672     




2000    2006    Difference between   H0: equal means   
(N = 274)  (N = 274)  2000 and 2006   Ha: difference > 0   
 
 
2.59e+07  2.34e+07  2471525    t = 1.985     
              p = 0.024 
 
 




Average labor productivity (sales per employee; in constant prices (2000 = 100)) 
 
 
2000    2005    Difference between   H0: equal means   
(N = 310)  (N = 310)  2000 and 2005   Ha: difference < 0   
 
 
153535   154410   -875      t = -0.1814     




2000    2006    Difference between   H0: equal means   
(N = 274)  (N = 274)  2000 and 2006   Ha: difference < 0   
 
 
160247   166261   -6014      t = -1.079     
              p = 0.141 
 
 
Note: The t-test does not assume equality of variance in the two groups CESifo Working Paper Series 
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